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Abstract
This paper deals with credit market imperfections and idiosyncratic risks in
a two–sector heterogeneous agent dynamic general equilibrium model of oc-
cupational choice. We focus especially on the effects of tightening financial
constraints on macroeconomic performance, entrepreneurial risk–taking, and
social mobility. Contrary to many models in the literature, our comparative
static results cover the entire range of borrowing constraints, from complete
markets to a perfectly constrained economy. In our baseline model, we find
substantial gains in output, welfare, and wealth equality associated with re-
laxing the constraints, but argue that it might also prove worthwhile to ex-
amine the marginal gains from credit market improvements. Interestingly, the
amount of entrepreneurial activity and social mobility increases if borrowing
constraints become more tight. These results can be attributed to the general
equilibrium nature of our approach, where optimal firm sizes and the demand
for credit are determined endogenously. The comparative static results on the
entrepreneurship rate and social mobility respond sensitively to a change in
income persistence.
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1 Introduction
This paper examines the effects of credit market imperfections and idiosyncratic
risks on occupational choice, macroeconomic performance, as well as on the income
and wealth distribution. Our analysis contributes to recent literature on dynamic
stochastic heterogeneous agent general equilibrium models concerned with risk and
distributional dynamics, for instance, Quadrini (2000), Meh (2005), Bohác˘ek (2006,
2007) and Cagetti and De Nardi (2006a,b,c).
We develop a model which combines the features of a Huggett (1993) /Aiyagari
(1994)–type economy with occupational choice under risk à la Kihlstrom and Laffont
(1979) and Kanbur (1979a,b), and the two–sector approach of Romer (1990), but
without endogenous growth. In each period of time, the risk–averse agents choose
between between two alternative occupations. They either set up an enterprise in
the intermediate goods industry which is characterized by monopolistic competi-
tion.1 Or, they supply their labor endowment to the production of a final good in
a perfectly competitive market. Producers of the final good use capital and labor
inputs, and differentiated varieties of the intermediate good. All households are
subject to an income risk. Managerial ability and productivity as a worker follow
independent random processes. Entrepreneurial activity is rewarded with a higher
expected income. Similar to Lucas (1978), there is no aggregate risk.
The economic performance in the intermediate goods industry crucially depends
on two factors: uncertainty and credit constraints. Business owners face an firm–
specific productivity shock, and there are no markets available for pooling the idio-
syncratic risks. Physical capital is the single input factor in the intermediate goods
industry. Entrepreneurs maximize their profits if their business operates at the opti-
mal firm size. For an individual wealth too small to maintain the optimal firm size,
the firm–owner would want to borrow the remaining amount on the credit market,
where he might be subject to financial constraints. If the entrepreneur is wealthy
enough, he operates his business at the profit–maximizing level and supplies the
rest of his wealth to the capital market. Contrary to many models in the literature
the two–sector general equilibrium approach allows us to endogenously determine
optimal firm sizes and credit constraints, and we do not have to fall back on fixed
investment projects (or entry costs respectively) in order to analyze the effects of
credit market frictions. There is no further portfolio choice in our framework. To
this end, our approach draws a simple picture of the empirical result, stated by
Heaton and Lucas (2000), that the entrepreneurial households’ business wealth on
average constitutes a relevant fraction of their total wealth.
Capital accumulation plays a twofold role in the context outlined above: On
the one hand, it endows individuals with the wealth necessary to set–up and op-
1See also Clemens (2006a,b) for entrepreneurial risk–taking in a general equilibrium context.
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erate a firm. On the other hand, buffer–stock saving provides a self–insurance on
intertemporal markets against the non–diversifiable income risk. Accordingly, we
find that wealthier households are more likely to be members of the entrepreneurial
class than poorer ones and there is a marked concentration of wealth in the hands
of entrepreneurs which is consistent with recent empirical findings (cf. Quadrini,
1999; Holtz-Eakin et al., 1994a). Upward mobility of entrepreneurs in our model
is primarily accumulation driven. The riskiness of entrepreneurial incomes looses
its importance for occupational choice once the household’s income share generated
from profits declines relative to his capital income. Nevertheless, in accordance with
Hamilton (2000), many entrepreneurs of our model enter and persist in business de-
spite the fact that they have lower initial earnings than average wage incomes.
We are especially interested in the question of how tightening financial con-
straints affects the macroeconomic general equilibrium regarding aggregate output,
the sectoral allocation of capital and labor, factor prices, the income and wealth dis-
tribution, occupational choice as well as the between–group mobility of households.
Our comparative static analysis covers the entire range of borrowing constraints,
from complete markets to a perfectly constrained economy. This is a novel approach
since many models of the literature consider a fixed equity–to–loan ratio, or rest
with a comparison of complete vs. a specific incomplete market, or they focus on
the no–credit market scenario. We find that increasing the degree of constraint is ac-
companied by substantial losses in aggregate output, consumption, wealth holdings,
and welfare, while wealth inequality increases.
Reviewing the empirical evidence, there is a strong support for the hypothe-
sis that borrowing constraints are an impediment to entering entrepreneurship;
see Evans and Leighton (1989), Evans and Jovanovic (1989), Holtz-Eakin et al.
(1994b), Blanchflower and Oswald (1998), Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen
(2002), as well as Desai et al. (2003).
Gentry and Hubbard (2004) point out that external financing has important im-
plications for individual investment and saving. This evidence is challenged by
Hurst and Lusardi (2004), who find that the likelihood of entering entrepreneur-
ship relative to initial wealth is flat over a large range of the wealth distribution and
increasing only for higher wealth levels of workers.
The general equilibrium nature of our approach generates surprising and almost
counter–intuitive results regarding the impact of credit constraints on occupational
choice under risk. If the idiosyncratic risks are serially correlated, more house-
holds choose the entrepreneurial profession in the constrained compared to the
unconstrained economy which is accompanied by a reduction in the average firm
size, both results contradicting findings reported in Cagetti and De Nardi (2006a).
Wealth inequality does not necessarily decline if we relax borrowing constraints. Ad-
ditionally, we observe an increase in between–group mobility, if credit constraints
become more binding. Workers and entrepreneurs with high individual productivity
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tend to remain in their present occupation, whereas low productivity individuals are
more likely to switch between professions.
These results reverse completely, if we consider iid shocks to individual produc-
tivity. In this case, credit constraints actually are an impediment to entrepreneurship.
Only the wealthy workers tend to switch between occupations and between–group
mobility drops down sharply for an increase in the tightness of credit constraints. Re-
garding the functional distribution of income, we find that credit constraints have a
redistributive effect by raising the profit income share at the cost of capital incomes.
The results indicate that the stochastic nature of the underlying idiosyncratic shocks
also plays an important role for the explanation of the general equilibrium effects of
financial constraints and credit market imperfections.
Recent contributions in this area of research suffer from several shortcomings
which our approach aims to overcome. In Quadrini (2000), occupational choice
and the level of entrepreneurship is (more or less) entirely governed by the un-
derlying productivity shocks. Li (2002) and Bohác˘ek (2006) discuss economies
with a single sector of production which does not allow for factor movements be-
tween industries and therefore neglects factor substitution. In our model, produc-
ers of the intermediate and the final good are subject to competition, especially
with respect to capital demand. Our approach does not have fixed entry costs
(in terms of discrete investment projects) of entrepreneurship as in Ghatak et al.
(2001), Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2003) or Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006) . In-
stead, we have an endogenously determined optimal firm size and no discontinuities
in individual credit demand. Occupational choice, entrepreneurial activity and per-
formance crucially depend on monopoly profits, market shares and relative factor
scarcity in the two sectors of production. Also different to Cagetti and De Nardi
(2006a) or Kitao (2008), the entrepreneurs of our economy are essential for ag-
gregate output. We will show that the interdependence of sectors is important
for the general equilibrium results on occupational choice, between–group mobility
and the income and wealth distribution, and contributes to the explanation of the
sometimes counter–intuitive effects of borrowing constraints outlined above. To this
end, the present paper is an extended version of Clemens and Heinemann (2006)
and Clemens (2008), where we focus on the relation between entrepreneurial risk–
taking and growth but do not consider financial constraints.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 develops the two–sector model. We
describe the equilibrium associated with a stationary earnings and wealth distribu-
tion. Because the formal structure of the model does not allow for analytical solu-
tions, we perform numerical simulations of a calibrated model in order to examine
the general equilibrium effects of an increase in the tightness of credit constraints.
Section 3 gives information on the calibration procedure and related empirical ev-
idence. Section 4 discusses the simulation results. Section 5 concludes. Technical
details are relegated to the Appendix.
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2 The Model
2.1 Overview
We consider a neoclassical growth model with two sectors of production. Drawing
from Quadrini (2000) and Romer (1990), we consider a corporate sector with per-
fectly competitive large firms who hire capital and labor services and use an inter-
mediate good in order to produce a homogeneous output which can be consumed or
invested respectively. The intermediate goods industry (noncorporate sector) con-
sists of a large number of small firms operating under the regime of monopolistic
competition. Each firm in this sector is owned and managed by an entrepreneur.
Both sectors of production are essential.
Market activity in the intermediate goods industry is constrained. In order to
run the business at the profit–maximizing firm size, entrepreneurs either possess
sufficient wealth of their own, or they need to compensate for their lack of eq-
uity by borrowing on the credit market, where they might be subject to borrowing
constraints. The two–sector setting allows us to endogenously relate financial con-
straints to individual characteristics and overall market activity.
The economy is populated by a continuum [0,1] of infinitely–lived households,
each endowed with one unit of labor. In each period of time, individuals follow their
occupation predetermined from the previous period and make a decision regarding
their future profession, which is either to become producers of the intermediate
good or to supply their labor services to the production of the final good. Labor
efficiency as well as entrepreneurial productivity are idiosyncratic random variables.
Regarding the associated income risk, we assume that wage incomes are less risky
than profit incomes. There is no aggregate risk.
With respect to the timing of events, we assume that individual occupational
choice takes place before the resolution of uncertainty. Once the draw of nature
has occurred, entrepreneurs as well as workers in the final goods sector know their
individual productivity. Those monopolists, who now discover their own wealth
being too low to operate at the optimal firms size, will express their capital demand
on the credit market, probably become subject to credit–constraints, and then start
production. After labor and profit income is realized, the households decide on
how much to consume and to invest. There is no capital income risk and no risk of
production in the corporate sector.
2.2 Final Goods Sector
The representative firm of the final goods sector produces a homogeneous good Y
using capital KF , labor L, and varieties of an intermediate good x( j), j ∈ [0,λ] as
inputs. Production in this sector takes place under perfect competition and the price
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of Y is normalized to unity. The production function is of the generalized CES–form2
Y =
(
KγF L
1−γ)1−α Z λ
0
x( j)α d j , 0 < α< 1, 0 < γ< 1 . (1)
Each type of intermediate good employed in the production of the final good is
identified with one monopolistic producer in the intermediate goods sector. Con-
sequently, the number of different types is identical with the population share λ
of entrepreneurs in the population. The number of entrepreneurs is determined
endogenously through occupational choices of the agents, which will be described
below. Additive–separability of (1) in intermediate goods ensures that the marginal
product of input j is independent of the quantity employed of j′ = j. Intermediate
goods are close but not perfect substitutes in production.
The profit of the representative firm in the final goods sector, πF , is given in each
period by
πF = Y −wL− (r+δ)KF−
Z λ
0
p( j)x( j) d j , (2)
where p( j) denotes the price of intermediate good j. We further assume physical
capital to depreciate over time at the constant rate δ, such that the interest factor
is given by R= 1+ r−δ. Optimization yields the profit maximizing factor demands
consistent with marginal productivity theory
KF = (1−α)γ
Y
r+δ , (3)
L= (1−α)(1− γ)Y
w
(4)
x( j) = KγFL
1−γ
(
α
p( j)
)1/(1−α)
. (5)
The monopolistic producer of intermediate good x( j) faces the isoelastic demand
function (5), where the direct price elasticity of demand is given by −1/(1−α).
Condition (4) describes aggregate labor demand in efficiency units. Equation (3) is
the final good sector demand for capital services.
2.3 Intermediate Goods Sector
The intermediate goods sector consists of the population fraction λ of entrepreneurs
who self–employ their labor endowment by operating a monopolistic firm. Each
monopolist produces a single variety j of the differentiated intermediate good by
2All macroeconomic variables are time–dependent. For notational convenience, we will drop the
explicit time–notation unless necessary.
6
employing capital from own wealth and borrowed resources according to the iden-
tical constant returns to scale technology of the form
x( j) = θ(i)e k(i) . (6)
Firm owners are heterogeneous in terms of their talent as entrepreneurs. They differ
with respect to the realization of an idiosyncratic productivity shock θ(i)e which is
assumed to be non–diversifiable and uncorrelated across firms. We will give more
details on the properties of the shock below. Entrepreneurs hire capital after the
draw of nature has occurred. The firm problem essentially is a static one. Under
perfect competition of the capital market, the producer treats the rental rate to
capital as exogenously given and maximizes his profit
π(k(i),θ(i)e) = p( j)x( j)− (r+δ)k(i) . (7)
Utilizing the demand function for intermediate good type–i, (5), and the pro-
duction technology (6), the optimal firm decision can be expressed in terms of the
optimal firm size k(i)∗ as a function of capital input, which is given by:
k(i)∗ = L(θ(i)e)
α
1−α
(
γw
(1− γ)(r+δ)
)γ
. (8)
Because capital demand takes place after the draw of nature has occurred, there is
no individual capital risk and no under–employment of input factors. The optimal
firm size increases with random individual productivity θ(i)e, such that more pro-
ductive business owners demand more capital on the capital market. Labor input in
efficiency units determines the optimal firm size by means of the demand function
for intermediate good type j. Aggregate employment is a weighted average and
depends on the size of the labor force 1− λ, i.e. the population fraction of agents
choosing the occupation of a worker, and the idiosyncratic shock on labor productiv-
ity θw. The larger the labor force 1−λ, the higher—ceteris paribus—will be aggregate
employment L. This goes along with fewer monopolists in the intermediate goods
industry, less competition, and a larger market share, as measured by the optimal
firm size.
2.4 Incomes and Equilibrium Income Shares in the Unconstrained Economy
Households derive income from three sources: labor income, capital income and
monopolistic profits. The technology parameters α and γ determine the division
of aggregate income among the three income sources in the absence of financial
constraints on entrepreneurial activity. According to marginal productivity theory,
we obtain from (1) a labor share of (1−α)(1− γ) and a capital share of (1−α)γ.
The remaining income share α accrues to the two types of income generated in the
intermediate goods sector, and splits on profits with α(1−α) and capital income with
α2, respectively, such that the economy–wide capital share amounts to (1−α)γ+α2.
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2.5 Capital Market and Financial Constraints
Firms of the final goods sector and the intermediate goods industry differ with re-
spect to access to financial markets. While the first are not constrained in their
financing, the latter face greater difficulties in diversifying the risk from their en-
trepreneurial activities and, moreover, are subject to borrowing constraints. En-
trepreneurs of the intermediate goods industry, who are wealth–constrained in op-
erating their business at the optimal size (8), seek external financing from finan-
cial intermediaries. The credit market is imperfect with respect to lenders not be-
ing able to enforce loan–repayment due to limited commitment of borrowers (cf.
Banerjee and Newman, 1993). In order not to default on loan contracts, borrowing
amounts are limited, and individual wealth acts as collateral. We do not explic-
itly model financial intermediaries and assume that there is no difference between
borrowing and lending rates.
In case of default, the financial intermediator is able to seize a fraction of the
borrowers gross capital income (1 + r)a(i). Alternatively, one could assume the
entrepreneur’s profit income to act as collateral. The major difference between the
two approaches is that, in the first case, borrowing amounts are entirely determined
by the debtors individual wealth a(i), whereas in the second, they also depend on
his entrepreneurial talent θ(i)e, which might be private information. We will discuss
the consequences of the second formulation in a separate treatment below.
The creditor will lend to the borrower only the amount consistent with the bor-
rower’s incentive compatibility constraint, such that it is in the borrower’s interest
to repay the loan and there is no credit default in equilibrium.
Let k(i) = a(i)+ b(i) be the firm size an entrepreneur is able to operate at from
own wealth a(i) and borrowed resources b(i). This operating capital k(i) is not nec-
essarily equal to the optimal firm size k(i)∗ determined in (8). An entrepreneur with
individual wealth a(i) lower than k(i)∗ would want to borrow the amount k(i)∗−a(i).
In case of k(i) < k(i)∗ the firm faces a borrowing constraint. Incentive compatibility
requires that it is never optimal for the borrower to default, that is
π(i)+ (1+ r)a(i)  π(i)+b(i)(1+ r)+ (1−φ)(1+ r)a(i)
b(i) ≤ φa(i) . (9)
The borrowing amount is limited such that the maximum possible loan is propor-
tional to the borrowers individual wealth a(i). The parameter φ is a measure for the
extent to which a lender can use the borrower’s wealth income as collateral. Credit
constraints become less tight with rising φ and vanish for large φ. The limiting
cases consequently reflect the two cases of either complete enforceability (φ→ ∞)
or no enforceability (φ = 0), such that in the first case the borrower is considered
solvent, whereas in the second one he is not. The sensitivity of results with respect
to changes φ constitutes the major part of our numerical analysis later on.
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Summing up, the operating firm size k(i) of entrepreneur iwith productivity θ(i)e
and wealth a(i) can be written as:
k(i) = k (θ(i)e ,a(i)) = min [a(i),k(i)∗]+min [φa(i),k(i)∗ −min [a(i),k(i)∗]] . (10)
The first term on the RHS of (10) reflects the size of a firm not seeking external
financing, where the business owner simply rests with his own wealth. The second
term describes the amount an entrepreneur with wealth a(i) will actually borrow.
The subsequent numerical analysis shows that the high–productivity entrepreneurs
are more likely to be constrained than the low–productivity ones, because the opti-
mal firm size and henceforth the capital demand increase in the productivity shock.
An entrepreneur, whose individual wealth exceeds the level needed to operate
his business at the optimal firm size will lend the amount a(i)− k(i)∗ on the cap-
ital market at the equilibrium interest rate. The supply side of the capital market
altogether consists of those entrepreneurs whose wealth exceeds their individual
optimal firm size and of workers, who supply their savings. On the demand side
we have the credit–constrained entrepreneurs and firms from the final goods indus-
try. From this follows immediately that the size of the intermediate goods industry
relative to the final goods sector essentially depends on occupational choice and
individual wealth accumulation, both determined endogenously in equilibrium.
2.6 Idiosyncratic Risks
In each period of time, workers are endowed with one unit of raw labor and are
subject to an idiosyncratic shock θw affecting labor supply in efficiency units, and
exposing each of them to an uninsurable income risk. For simplicity, we assume
that labor productivity θw evolves according to a first–order Markov process with
h = 1, . . . ,m states, and θw,h > 0. The transition matrix associated with the Markov
process is Pw .
Entrepreneurial productivity θe also evolves according to a first–order Markov
process with h = 1, . . . ,m different states θe,1, . . . ,θe,m; θe,h > 0, and transition prob-
ability Pe . Since agents can either be workers or entrepreneurs, it is possible to
identify the occupational status of an agent with his productivity in the respective
occupation. We assume worker productivities to be more evenly distributed than
managerial skills, such that profit incomes in general are more risky than wage
incomes. As is well–known from the literature, entrepreneurs on average are com-
pensated with a positive income differential (aka ‘risk premium’) for bearing the
production risk.
By modeling two distinct random processes for workers and entrepreneurs, we
take into account that the two professions demand different talents, for instance spe-
cific managerial skills. We assume the processes θw and θe to be uncorrelated, such
that for an individual the conditional expectation of entrepreneurial productivity is
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independent of the labor efficiency, if employed as a worker.3 A high productivity
as a worker in the present does not necessarily indicate an equivalently high future
productivity as an entrepreneur, if the individual should decide to switch between
occupations in the next period. The associated probabilities are summarized in a
m×m transition matrices Pn,n′ describing the transition from productivity state θn,h
to state θn′,h′ for h,h′ = 1, . . . ,m, n= e,w and n = n′.
We consider two different specifications regarding the Markov processes for en-
trepreneurial talent and worker efficiency respectively. Shocks of the first setting
are serially correlated, thus introducing a certain persistence in individual income
processes. Currently highly productive workers and entrepreneurs are more likely
to be highly productive in the future. The individual is able to infer from his present
productivity how his future productivity in the same occupation will be. Shocks of
the second setting are iid. Although empirically not supported, when confronted
with the data (cf. Guvenen, 2007, and references therein), the second setting allows
us to illustrate the role intertemporal income persistence has for occupational choice
and social mobility.
2.7 Intertemporal Decision and Occupational Choice
Each household i has preferences over consumption and maximizes discounted ex-
pected lifetime utility
E0
∞
∑
t=0
βt U [ct(i)] 0 < β< 1 .
E0 is the expectation operator conditional on information at date 0 and β is the
discount factor. Individuals are assumed to be identical with respect to their pref-
erences regarding momentary consumption c(i) which are described by constant
relative risk aversion
U [c(i)] =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
c(i)1−ρ
1−ρ for ρ> 0,ρ = 1
lnc(i) for ρ= 1 ,
where ρ denotes the Arrow/Pratt measure of relative risk aversion.
In each period, the single household is endowed with a unit of raw labor and—
in addition to his intertemporal decision—makes a choice on his future occupation,
which is either to become a self–employed producer of an intermediate good in the
monopolistically competitive market or to supply his labor services in efficiency units
inelastically to the production of the final good. Occupational choice, once made in
a certain period, is irreversible.
LetVw(a(i),θ(i)w,h) denote the optimal value function of an agent currently being
a worker with wealth a(i), who is in productivity state θw,h, h= 1, . . . ,m. If he decides
3The analysis of correlated skill processes is left for future research.
10
to remain a worker, his productivity evolves according to the transition matrix Pw
of the underlying Markov process with states θw,1, . . . ,θw,m . If, instead, he decides
to become an entrepreneur in the following period, his next period productivity θ′e
is determined by the transition matrix Pw,e. For analytical convenience, individual
asset holdings are bounded from below, the lowest possible wealth level set to a= 0.
The associated maximized value function for a typical individual currently being
a worker is given by
Vw (a(i),θ(i)w,h) =
max
c(i)0,a(i)′a
{
U [c(i)]+β max
ξ′∈{0,1}
{
E
[
Vw
(
a(i)′,θ(i)′w,h
)
|θ(i)w,h
]
, E
[
Ve
(
a(i)′,θ(i)′e,h
)]}}
s.t. a(i)′ = (1+ r)a(i)+θ(i)w,h w− c(i) .
(11)
ξ is a boolean variable which takes on the values 0 or 1, depending on whether or not
the agent decides to switch between occupations. r and w denote the equilibrium
returns to capital and labor in efficiency units, which are constant over time for a
stationary distribution of wealth and occupational statuses over agents. The optimal
decision associated with the problem (11) is described by the two decision rules for
individual asset holdings a(i)′w = aw (a(i), θ(i)w,h) and the future professional state
ξ(i)′w = ξw (a(i), θ(i)w,h).
Let Ve(a(i),θ(i)e,h) denote the maximized value function of an entrepreneur with
wealth a(i) in productivity state θ(i)e,h, who faces a decision problem similar to
those of a worker. If he decides to remain an entrepreneur, his productivity evolves
according to the transition matrix Pe of the underlying Markov process with states
θe,1, . . . ,θe,m. If, instead, he decides to switch between occupations by becoming a
worker in the next period, his future productivity θ′w is determined by the transi-
tion matrix Pe,w. With k(θ(i)e,h)∗ denoting the optimal firm size, the intertemporal
problem of an entrepreneur currently in productivity state θ(i)e,h, can be written as
Ve(a(i),θ(i)e,h) =
max
c(i)0,a(i)′a
{
U [c(i)]+β max
ξ′∈{0,1}
{
E
[
Ve
(
a(i)′,θ(i)′e,h
)
|θ(i)e,h
]
,E
[
Vw
(
a(i)′,θ(i)′w,h
)]}}
s.t. a(i)′ = (1+ r)a(i)+π(k(i),θ(i)e,h)− c(i)
k(i) = min [a(i),k(θ(i)e,h)∗]+min [φa(i),k(θ(i)e,h)∗ −min [a(i),k(θ(i)e,h)∗]]
π(θ(i)e,h,k(i)) = p(x(i))x(θ(i)e,h ,k(i))− (r+δ)k(i)
(12)
Again, ξ is a boolean variable, indicating the agent’s decision on leaving or remaining
in his present occupation. The optimal decision is described by the decision rules
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for individual asset holdings a(i)′e = ae(a(i), θ(i)e,h) and the future professional state
ξ(i)′e = ξe(a(i), θ(i)e,h).4
In general, our model generates the same implications for individual savings
and wealth accumulation under risk as, for instance, discussed in Aiyagari (1994)
or Huggett (1996). Similar to Quadrini (2000) we additionally consider occupa-
tional choice. Consequently, wealth accumulation plays a two–fold role: On the one
hand, the shocks to worker efficiency and entrepreneurial productivity generate an
income risk which households respond to with buffer–stock saving. On the other
hand, higher wealth levels protect entrepreneurs against the danger of being sub-
ject to financial constraints. In terms of Sandmo (1970) there is only an income but
no capital risk in our model, such that the share of risky incomes in total household
income declines with growing wealth. Accordingly, the importance of risky prof-
its providing negative incentives towards entrepreneurship fades for high levels of
wealth.
2.8 Stationary Recursive Equilibrium
A stationary recursive competitive general equilibrium is an allocation, where equi-
librium prices generate a distribution of wealth and occupations over agents which is
consistent with these prices given the exogenous process for the idiosyncratic shocks
and the agents’ optimal decision rules.
Let KF , L and x( j)D denote the demands of capital, effective labor and interme-
diate goods in the final goods sector. We obtain aggregate labor supply by summing
up individual labor supplies in efficiency units over the population fraction 1−λ of
workers. Let, furthermore, qh,h = 1, . . . ,m denote probabilities of states θw,h in the
equilibrium distribution of labor productivities. The stationary recursive equilibrium
is a set of value functionsVw (a,θw), Ve(a,θe), decision rules aw (a; θw), ξw (a; θw) and
ae(a; θe), ξe(a; θe), prices w, r, p( j) and a distribution λ,1−λ of households over oc-
cupations such that:
(i) the decision rules aw (a; θw), ξw (a; θw) and ae(a; θe), ξe(a; θe) solve the workers’
and entrepreneurs’ problems (11) and (12) at prices w, r, p( j),
(ii) the aggregate demands of consumption, labor, capital and intermediate goods
are the aggregation of individual demands. Factor and commodity markets
clear at constant prices w, r, p( j), where factor inputs are paid according to
4Note that the value functions (11) and (12) may not be concave because of the boolean variable
ξ, indicating binary choice between occupations. Similar to Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2003), we
would like to stress that the dynamic programming algorithm underlying our computational modeling
does not require concavity but monotonicity to converge to the true value function; see also Bohác˘ek
(2007, fn. 4).
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their marginal product:
Y =C+δK
Z 1
0
k(i) d i≡ K = KF +
Z λ
0
k(i)d i
Z 1
λ
m
∑
h=1
qh θw,h d i= L
x( j)S = x( j)D ,
(iii) the stationary distribution Γ(λ,a,Pe,Pw,Pe,w,Pw,e) of agents over individual
wealth holdings, occupations and associated productivities is the fixed point
of the law of motion which is consistent with the individual decision rules
and equilibrium prices. The distribution λ,1−λ of agents over occupations is
time–invariant.
The decision rules for workers, aw(a, sw), ξw(a, sw), and entrepreneurs, ae(a, se),
ξe(a, se), together with the stochastic processes for individual labor productivity and
entrepreneurial productivity, determine the stationary distribution Γ at equilibrium
prices w,r. The stationary distribution Γ governs the entrepreneurship rate (i.e. the
mass of firms in the intermediate goods sector), the efficiency units of labor sup-
plied by workers, capital demand of the intermediate goods sector, and the aggre-
gate capital supply, the latter equaling the mean of individual wealth holdings. Once
the entrepreneurship rate λ is derived, this together with the stationary distribution
of entrepreneurial productivities determines the supply of intermediate goods.
3 Calibration
The model is calibrated to match standard macro data from OECD countries. Table 1
summarizes the parameterization of the model. Regarding preferences, we set the
discount factor β and the coefficient of relative risk aversion ρ according to estimates
from the literature, in order to generate equilibrium interest rates on safe assets
consistent with empirical findings (cf. Mehra and Prescott, 1985; Obstfeld, 1994).
The parameters of production technology, α and γ, are chosen such as to generate
an equilibrium labor income share of 0.63 which matches empirical observations
e.g. for the U.S. economy (King and Rebelo, 1999). The corresponding capital and
profit income shares of the frictionless economy (φ→ ∞) are 0.16 and 0.21. PSID
data report a income share for entrepreneurs of around 22%. The depreciation rate
is fixed at 6%, which also is a standard choice in the literature.
The steady state of the simulated economy by and large replicates the Gini coef-
ficient of wealth inequality in the range of 0.55 to 0.75 usually observed for OECD
countries. Introducing occupational choice into Aiyagari (1994)–type models of
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Table 1: Parameters of the baseline model
α γ δ β ρ φ
0.3 0.1 0.06 0.95 2.0 0 ↔ ∞
uninsurable shocks and borrowing constraints, improves the prediction of wealth
inequality, especially in the upper tail of the distribution (cf. Quadrini, 2000).
We consider an entrepreneur as someone, who owns and operates a small busi-
ness, and who is willing to take risks, to be innovative, and to exploit profit oppor-
tunities (Knight, 1921; Schumpeter, 1930; Kirzner, 1973). Definitions of self–em-
ployment and entrepreneurial activity differ widely across countries.5 According to
the OECD, self–employment encompasses “. . . those jobs, where the remuneration is
directly dependent upon the profits derived from the goods and services produced. The
incumbents make the operational decisions affecting the enterprise, or delegate such de-
cisions while retaining responsibility for the welfare of the enterprise.” (OECD, 2000,
Ch. 5, p. 191). Our model generates self–employment business ownership rates
around 20%, which is somewhat more at the upper range of values for OECD coun-
tries (including owner–managers), matching countries like New Zealand (20.8%),
Italy (24.8%), or Spain (18.3%); see also the annual Global Entrepreneurship Mon-
itor (e.g. GEM 2005, Minniti et al.) for data on total entrepreneurial activity.
Entry rates into entrepreneurship equal exit rates in the stationary recursive
equilibrium. Our model was calibrated to generate entry rates around 15%, which
is higher than the rates reported by Evans (1987) for the U.S. and also in the
upper range of empirically plausible values for OECD countries (cf. Vale, 2006;
Aghion et al., 2007).
The fraction of aggregate capital employed in the (corporate) final goods sector
strongly depends on two factors: First, on the strictness of financial constraints
effective in the intermediate goods industry, which we vary over the entire domain
from perfect markets (φ→ ∞) to a complete absence of credit markets (φ = 0), and
second, on the degree of persistence of the idiosyncratic shocks. Consequently, our
results cover a wide range for the percentage of capital inputs in the final goods
sector from 43% to over 60%, the latter being consistent with U.S. data reported
by Quadrini (2000). The capital–to–output ratio of the simulated economy ranges
around values of 2.
To take account of empirically observed income persistence, we assume that the
processes for labor efficiency θw and entrepreneurial productivity θe are lognormal
with normalized mean lnθw ∼ N
(
−σ2w/2,σ2w
)
, lnθe ∼ N
(
−σ2e/2,σ2e
)
and AR(1) of
5Often, the agricultural sector is excluded from the computation of entrepreneurship rates.
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the general form:
lnθ′w = (pw−1)
σ2w
2
+ pw lnθw+σw
√
1− p2w ε , (13)
lnθ′e = (pe−1)
σ2e
2
+ pe lnθe+σe
√
1− p2e ε , (14)
where ε∼ N (0,1). The process (13) was parameterized following Aiyagari (1994).
With respect to the process (14) we assume an identical serial correlation, but
choose a larger variance in order to reproduce the higher risk associated with entre-
preneurial activity. Table 2 presents the parameter values underlying the stochastic
processes.
Table 2: Parameters of the stochastic processes
σw pw σe pe
0.2 0.6 1.5 0.6
The processes are approximated with a five–state Markov chain by using the
method described in Tauchen (1986). The transition matrices for individuals who
decide to switch occupations are derived from the stationary distributions of the
respective Markov processes. The probability for a worker (entrepreneur) of ending
up in a specific state of entrepreneurial (worker) productivity θe,h (θw,h) is given by
the stationary (unconditional) probabilities of this state. The algorithm for finding
the equilibrium consists of three nested loops, starting from an initial guess on
factor prices w,r and employment L, then iterating until markets are cleared and
the conditions of a stationary recursive equilibrium are met.
4 Results
Our baseline model is a model of income and earnings persistence. We investigate
the effects of financial constraints on (a) inequality and the distribution of wealth,
(b) on output, factor prices, and the factor income distribution, and (c) on occupa-
tional choice and social mobility.
A common finding for models with credit market imperfections is that the prop-
erties of the equilibrium often respond non–monotonically to parameter changes.
If we look at the literature, we find models assessing the effects of credit market
imperfections by assuming no credit market at all. Other approaches compare im-
perfect to perfect markets. As Matsuyama (2007, p. 3) points out, there is no reason
to believe that, first, the effects of an imperfect market equal those of no credit
market, and second, the effects of improving credit markets are similar to those of
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completely eliminating market imperfections. Instead of discussing only a single
case by assuming a predetermined magnitude of financial constraint, we vary the
tightness of constraints in our simulations to cover the range from no credit market
(φ = 0) to a perfect market (φ→ ∞).6 Although the value of φ is fixed exogenously,
the credit demand as well as the amount of rationing is determined endogenously
and depends on firm specific factors, such as the optimal business size (8), individual
wealth, equilibrium factor prices and the realization of the ability shock.
Regarding the comparative static results, we find that the properties of the equi-
librium respond sensitive to a change in serial correlation. We contrast the baseline
model, where processes are serially correlated, with the case of serially uncorrelated
shocks and find striking differences with regard to the equilibrium entrepreneurship
rate and mobility between occupations.
Our analysis proceeds as follows: We first investigate to what extent our model
is able to replicate empirical evidence on wealth distributions. We then examine
how the presence of credit constraints affects the key macroeconomic variables,
such as aggregate output, average firm size, factor prices and factor income shares
as well as individual incomes, household wealth and the degree of inequality, the
latter measured by the Gini coefficient. In a next step, we analyze mobility be-
tween occupations. The comparative static analysis concludes with the discussion
of ability–related borrowing constraints. We also contrast the baseline model with
the case of uncorrelated shocks.7
4.1 Results for the Baseline Model
Wealth distribution Figure 1a shows the distribution of wealth over individuals for
the two limiting cases of an unconstrained economy (φ→ ∞) versus fully absent
markets for loans (φ= 0). As can be seen, the presence of financial constraints tends
to reduce the mass of very wealthy individuals. Moreover, the distribution becomes
more concentrated at lower wealth levels in the case of no credit markets. Figure
1b, displaying the wealth distribution in a logarithmic scale, brings out more visibly
the differences between the two cases, especially for the domain of very low wealth
levels. A major consequence of borrowing constraints in the underlying model is that
the fraction of individuals, for whom the bottom threshold (a(i)  a = 0) actually
becomes binding, rises from about 2% of the population to a value around 5%.
Figure 2 shows the stationary distribution of wealth for the two limiting cases
φ→∞ and φ= 0 differentiated with respect to the two occupational classes. In gen-
6Tables 3 and 4 only display selected cases, with perfect markets (φ→∞), no credit markets (φ= 0)
and the case, where the lower bound for the equity–loan–ratio is one half of the operating capital
(φ = 1). The upper limit is approximated with φ = 1000 in our numerical simulations. Figures 4, 6,
and 7 cover a wider range of values for φ from our simulations.
7Throughout the discussion of results we will refer to ‘optimal’ levels as those of the unconstrained
economy, thereby blinding out risk and imperfect competition as additional sources of inefficiency.
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Figure 1: Wealth distribution in the baseline model, φ→ ∞ (dashed) and φ= 0 (solid)
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Figure 2: Wealth distribution in the baseline model for workers (solid) and entre-
preneurs (dashed) with φ→ ∞ and φ= 0
eral, our model produces wealth distributions similar to those reported in the liter-
ature for heterogeneous agent models with entrepreneurial activity (see Quadrini,
1999, 2000; Cagetti and De Nardi, 2006a). We observe that workers are more con-
centrated at lower wealth levels, and there exists a significant mass of wealthy en-
trepreneurs but also a comparably large share of poorer ones. This is in line with
empirical findings by Gentry and Hubbard (2004); Hamilton (2000) as well as with
related theoretical contributions (cf. Bohác˘ek, 2006, 2007). Relaxing credit con-
straints significantly increases the mass of entrepreneurs in the upper tail of the
distribution, but also leads towards an outward shift of the worker PDF of wealth,
increasing mean and modal worker wealth levels.
Figure 3 shows the cumulative distribution of firm sizes in the intermediate
goods sector for three distinct values of the parameter φ which indicates the tight-
ness of financial constraints. Each entrepreneur is able to operate his business at the
optimal firm size (8) in the perfect market case (φ→ ∞). Consequently, we observe
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Figure 3: CDF of firm size in the baseline model with φ→ ∞ (dashed), φ = 1.0
(dotted) and φ= 0 (solid)
a stepwise CDF, each step corresponding to the optimal firm size associated with
one out of the five underlying possible productivity states θe,h.
Consider next the case φ = 1, where entrepreneurs are able to acquire external
financing up to maximum sum equal to their own wealth. Here, the operating
firm size is bounded from above to twice the amount of individual wealth, which
need not be the optimal firm size, especially, if the firm owner is highly productive.
Recall at this point that the optimal firm size is endogenously determined; besides
idiosyncratic random productivity also depending on factor prices, which in turn are
determined by aggregate market activities and occupational choice in the general
equilibrium.
The first observation is that the optimal firm sizes rise slightly for each possible
state of entrepreneurial talent θe,h. This increase in firm sizes can be ascribed to the
factor price effect. Borrowing constraints prevent the efficient allocation of capital
among sectors such that too much capital is employed in the production of the final
good. This is associated with a decline in the real interest rate, which in turn raises
the optimal firm size in the intermediate sector for each state of productivity.
The second, major observation in the credit–constrained economy is that there is
a positive mass of entrepreneurs between each two subsequent steps of optimal firm
sizes, and the distribution is more concentrated at smaller firm sizes. Constraints
become binding for many entrepreneurs, who now have to operate their enterprise
at a suboptimally low scale. Non–surprisingly, this effect is aggravated, if we reduce
the availability of external financing to naught. For φ = 0, steps in the CDF almost
vanish, which means that more business owners are subject to constraints. The
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Table 3: Simulation results — baseline model and modified credit constraint
Tightness of constraints
φ→ ∞ φ = 1.0 φ= 0
baseline model modified constraint
entrepreneurship rate (%) 0.230 0.247 0.243 0.250
∅ firm size total 0.652 0.440 0.504 0.296
∅ credit rationing total 0.000 0.330 0.205 0.637
∅ profits total 0.134 0.124 0.130 0.114
final Y 0.147 0.130 0.139 0.111
goods KF (%) 0.438 0.521 0.492 0.612
sector KF 0.116 0.118 0.119 0.116
LF 0.820 0.796 0.805 0.786
factor w 0.113 0.103 0.109 0.089
prices r 0.028 0.017 0.022 0.007
w/(r+δ) 1.277 1.337 1.326 1.335
factor labor 0.630 0.630 0.630 0.630
income capital 0.160 0.134 0.142 0.114
shares profits 0.210 0.236 0.228 0.256
∅ wealth total 0.266 0.227 0.241 0.190
workers 0.203 0.167 0.180 0.128
entrepreneurs 0.477 0.410 0.431 0.378
∅ income workers 0.138 0.121 0.131 0.102
entrepreneurs 0.176 0.156 0.166 0.139
risk premium 0.118 0.141 0.126 0.218
∅ consumption 0.131 0.117 0.125 0.100
welfare -8.024 -8.966 -8.397 -10.504
wealth total 0.559 0.556 0.557 0.599
inequality workers 0.506 0.528 0.511 0.588
(Gini) entrepreneurs 0.546 0.488 0.525 0.478
mobility 0.143 0.154 0.152 0.156
optimal levels of firm sizes for the different states of productivity rise even further,
due to the factor price effect. In numbers, if we compare the unconstrained with
the completely constrained economy, businesses in the entrepreneurial sector on
average operate at 32% of their respective optimal firm size.
Macroeconomic effects Table 3 and Figure 4 summarize the results for the macroe-
conomic key variables of the calibrated baseline model. The general picture reflects
the outcome one would expect from credit market improvements. Aggregate output
Y , consumption, aggregate wealth holdings a, factor prices r,w and incomes as well
as welfare increase if we relax borrowing constraints.
19
2 4 6 8 10
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
φ
(a) % of optimal average firmsize
2 4 6 8 10
0.23
0.235
0.24
0.245
0.25
φ
(b) Entrepreneurship rate
2 4 6 8 10
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
φ
(c) Y relative to φ→ ∞
2 4 6 8 10
-10.5
-10
-9.5
-9
-8.5
-8
φ
(d) Welfare
2 4 6 8 10
0.19
0.2
0.21
0.22
0.23
0.24
0.25
0.26
φ
(e) Wealth holdings
2 4 6 8 10
0.55
0.56
0.57
0.58
0.59
0.6
φ
(f) Gini of total wealth
2 4 6 8 10
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
φ
labor
capital
profit
(g) Functional distribution of income
2 4 6 8 10
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.008
0.012
0.016
0.02
0.024
0.028
φ
w (left scale)
r (right scale)
(h) Factor prices
Figure 4: Macroeconomic effects of a change in φ, baseline model
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Figure 4: Macroeconomic effects of a change in φ, baseline model (cont.)
Figure 4 shows that, except for wealth inequality (which we will refer to later),
the response of the macroeconomic variables to a change in φ is monotonous. The
overall loss in output of a perfectly constrained compared to a frictionless economy
lies at about 25%, and wealth holdings only make up to 72% of their optimal level.
Increasing financial constraints goes along with a substantial drop in economic per-
formance. Average consumption declines by 24% and the associated welfare loss of
the simulated model amounts to 30%.
We also see from Figure 4 that the response of output, wealth, factor prices, and
welfare to a change in φ is concave. The marginal gains of improving credit markets
are much higher for small values of φ, especially in the range of loan–to–equity ratios
from 0 < φ< 2, which is the empirically plausible domain. This interval accounts for
more than two–thirds of the overall output loss associated with financial constraints.
Given the general equilibrium nature of the underlying model, one would expect
several adjustments to take place following a reduction in external financing as
borrowing constraints become more tight. If there is only limited or no capital
demand from the intermediate goods industry, we observe a capital–relocation effect
between sectors. More capital is employed in the final goods industry. This amounts
to shifting about 17% of the aggregate capital stock from the intermediate to the
final goods sector over the entire range 0  φ < ∞. The average excess demand for
capital in the intermediate goods industry amounts to more than twice the average
firm size.
With diminishing marginal returns, the equilibrium interest rate r, and accord-
ingly the factor price for capital r+δ, decline in both sectors of the economy. Recall-
ing that entrepreneurial households receive income from two sources, profits and
capital incomes, the income share reflecting the user costs of capital declines for
any given level of individual wealth, whereas the profit share rises. Altogether, we
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observe a shift in the functional income distribution from capital to profit incomes
of 4.6 p.p. over the entire domain of φ.8 The additional employment of capital c.p.
raises labor productivity. The factor–price ratio w/(r+ δ) increases, but only by a
small scale of 4.4%, because this effect is partly offset by a reduction in intermediate
good inputs, the latter reducing labor productivity.
The presence of credit constraints not necessarily implies that only those agents
choose to become an entrepreneur, who have sufficient own wealth and borrowed
resources to operate their business at the optimal firm size k∗. These are the only
firms which actually maximize their profits, whereas the constrained entrepreneurs
are forced to operate at suboptimally small business sizes. Consequently, the aver-
age firm size in the intermediate goods industry decreases substantially as financial
constraints become more tight, and highly productive entrepreneurs are more af-
fected by the constraints than those with a low θe. Figure 4a shows that in a com-
pletely constrained economy the average firm size only amounts to around 32% of
its optimal size.
Most strikingly, this result is also partly due to the fact that the entrepreneurship
rate increases by almost 2 p.p. for smaller values of φ. Instead of less competition in
the intermediate goods industry, as one might have expected, we observe an increase
in the number of firms in the constrained economy. This, however, comes at the cost
of smaller market shares and lower average profits (–15%).
A higher rate of entrepreneurship as a consequence of tightening borrowing
constraints is to some extent a counter–intuitive result and can be traced back to the
general equilibrium nature of our approach. Credit constraints are only one out of
several determinants of occupational choice. The competition for capital between
the final and intermediate goods sector determines the equilibrium interest rate,
the firm size and expected profits of the monopolistic enterprises. The expected
premium of entrepreneurial incomes over wages, too, affects the individual decision
on the future occupation. Figure 4i shows that the expected income differential
attains its largest value in the perfectly constrained economy, then dropping sharply
by more than 46% for an increase in φ.
Households continuously decide between two lotteries and possess (at least sub-
jective) knowledge regarding the stochastic properties of the underlying shocks. If
shocks are serially correlated, a low–productivity worker is aware of the fact that
being also lowly productive in the future is a more probable outcome than other-
wise. Consequently, he might be inclined to take his chances with entrepreneurship,
knowing that his current productivity as a worker is not related to his future pro-
ductivity as a business owner.9
8See 2.4 for a short remark on the equilibrium factor shares of the frictionless economy.
9Relaxing this assumption is left for future research; see also Cagetti and De Nardi (2006a, Ap-
pendix) on this issue.
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Table 4: Mobility in the baseline model: Individual probability of a switch in
occupations with respect to current productivity state and wealth quintile
Tightness of constraints Tightness of constraints
Productivity φ→ ∞ φ= 1 φ= 1a φ = 0 Quintile φ→ ∞ φ= 1 φ = 1a φ= 0
θw,1 1 0.51 0.73 0.37 1. 0.15 0.06 0.12 0
θw,2 0.92 0.70 0.85 0.53 2. 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.13
workers θw,3 0.10 0.18 0.14 0.21 3. 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.13
θw,4 0 0 0 0.02 4. 0.12 0.32 0.21 0.46
θw,5 0 0 0 0 5. 0.58 0.59 0.59 0.65
θe,1 1 1 1 1 1. 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76
θe,2 1 1 1 1 2. 0.76 0.74 0.74 0.76
entre- θe,3 1 1 1 0.99 3. 0.64 0.68 0.66 0.67
preneurs θe,4 0 0 0 0 4. 0.58 0.65 0.62 0.67
θe,5 0 0 0 0 5. 0.56 0.54 0.54 0.55
aColumn depicts probabilities of the model with modified constraints, see Section 4.2.
Regarding the wealth distribution, we first observe a sharp decline in the Gini
coefficient for a rise in φ from 0.60 to 0.54, which is then followed by a gradual
increase in overall wealth inequality back to a value of 0.56. This non–monotonic
behavior of total wealth inequality can be explained, if we look at the within–group
inequality for workers and entrepreneurs respectively. Table 3 shows that wealth be-
comes more unevenly distributed among workers, whereas wealth inequality among
entrepreneurs declines.10
Mobility Next, we are interested in the mobility between occupations taking place
under the stationary distribution. Table 3 and Figure 4j show that around 15% of
the population switch between occupations in each period. We even observe over-
all mobility to increase by 8% if credit constraints become more tight. While this
change in overall mobility might seem small from a quantitative perspective, it is
nevertheless remarkable, since it indicates that credit constraints not only increase
the entrepreneurship rate of the economy but also the fluctuation between occupa-
tions.
Table 4 presents the quantitative results for each of the five productivity states
θe,h, θw,h and with respect to wealth quintiles. A more detailed look at the mobility
patterns shown in Table 4 reveals that generally workers and entrepreneurs who
exhibit a low productivity (θ1− θ3) in their current profession decide to switch be-
tween professions, whereas the high productivity individuals (θ4,θ5) stay put. For
instance, all workers in the unconstrained economy, who currently are in the low-
est labor productivity state, decide to take their chances with entrepreneurship in
10Notice, that the Gini coefficient does not allow for a simple decomposition of total inequality into
inequality within and between subgroups.
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the next period. However, the probability of status change responds sensitive to
the degree of credit availability. For φ = 0, the probability drops down by almost
two–thirds. As a general result we find that the likelihood of workers to start a busi-
ness and become self–employed in the next period decreases in productivity and in
constrained access to external financing. More productive workers show a larger
persistence in their present occupation.
Regarding mobility, the picture is even more striking for individuals, who cur-
rently are low productivity entrepreneurs. (Almost) All entrepreneurs finding them-
selves in the lowest three productivity states change their occupation. They, (almost)
with certainty will exit the market to seek employment as a worker in the next pe-
riod. This results holds irrespective of the degree of constraint. Summing up, mo-
bility over occupations in our model is confined to agents who are not successful in
their current professions.
The intuition is as outlined before: Serially correlated shocks provide agents
with a signal regarding future productivity. Since we assumed the processes for
labor efficiency and entrepreneurial ability to be uncorrelated, a worker can infer
from a low productivity today a probably low labor efficiency tomorrow, but this not
necessarily indicates a equally low future ability as entrepreneur, which is given by
the unconditional probability of states.
Table 4 also shows how the mobility over occupations depends on individual
wealth. Conditional on the given occupation and the tightness of credit constraints,
the values in the table represent the probability for a change of occupation for each
quintile of the wealth distribution. As can be seen, the probability for a worker
to become an entrepreneur increases in wealth, whereas the opposite is true for
entrepreneurs. The general mobility pattern is robust over different levels of φ. The
result is, however, not quite surprising given the fact that agents are risk averse and
that profit income is more risky than labor income.
While the effects of credit constraints on the mobility patterns for entrepreneurs
are only small in scale, we observe significant effects on mobility patterns for work-
ers. More tight credit constraints strikingly decrease the probabilities of becoming
an entrepreneur for poor workers, while the corresponding probabilities for rich
workers (especially for those in the fourth quintile) increase. New entrepreneurs
are mainly recruited among the group of wealthy workers.
4.2 An Alternative Formulation of Borrowing Constraints
The borrowing of the baseline model were assumed to be entirely related to in-
dividual wealth. We will now discuss a separate treatment, where the maximum
loan also depends on the entrepreneur’s individual productivity. In case of de-
fault, the lender is able to seize the fraction φ of the borrower’s gross income
(1 + r)a(i)+ π(θ(i)e,a(i)+b(i)) of period t. The associated incentive compatibility
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Figure 5: CDF of firm size with φ= 1 for the baseline model (solid) and the model
with modified credit constraint (dashed)
constraint making sure that it is never optimal for the borrower of going into default
becomes:
π(θ(i)e,a(i)+b(i))+ (1+ r)a(i) (1−φ) [π(θ(i)e,a(i)+b(i))+ (1+ r)a(i)] + (1+ r)b(i)
⇐⇒
b(i)
a(i)
≤ φ+φ π(θ(i)e,a(i)+b(i))
(1+ r)a(i)
(15)
The upper bound for the debt–to–equity ratio now also depends on the entrepren-
eur’s profitability. It increases with a higher realization θ(i)e of the idiosyncratic
productivity shock.
Figure 5 shows the resulting cumulative distribution function of firmsizes for the
modified model and compares it with the baseline setting for the case of φ = 1. A
comparison between eqs. (9) and (15) shows that including profit incomes into the
collateral raises the debt–to–equity ratio by the amount of the second term on the
RHS of equation (15).
Obviously, the model modification does not alter the general picture of how fi-
nancial constraints affect the size distribution of firms. We observe a greater number
of larger firms. The optimal firm sizes (indicated by the steps in the CDF) decrease
slightly for each state of entrepreneurial talent θe,h. This, again, can be explained
with the factor price effect. If being more productive compensates for a lack of
wealth, we expect the overall credit supply to the intermediate goods industry to be
larger than in the baseline model. Less capital is employed in the final good sector,
and the real interest rate rises. The larger user cost of capital explain the decrease
in the optimal firm size in the noncorporate sector for each state of productivity.
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Figure 6: Properties of the model with modified credit constraint (solid) for differ-
ent levels of φ compared to the baseline model (dashed)
26
The last column of Table 3 presents the results from the numerical simulation of
the modified model for φ= 1. Naturally, there should be no differences in results for
the two limiting cases of perfect (φ→ ∞) or no credit market (φ = 0) respectively.
Figure 6 compares the baseline to the modified setting. We find the major results of
our analysis preserved.
The significant effect is one in magnitude. Compared to the baseline model,
the maximum loan is positively related to individual entrepreneurial productivity,
which is effective for any given value of 0 < φ< ∞. This constitutes a credit market
improvement, because now also relatively poor but highly productive agents are el-
igible for external financing. If we consider the case of φ = 1, the loss in aggregate
output compared to the perfect market scenario now only amounts to 5%, versus
11.5% of the baseline model. Qualitatively similar results can be observed for aver-
age wealth, individual incomes, consumption and factor prices, which exceed their
corresponding values of the baseline economy. Wealth inequality is slightly larger
under the modified borrowing constraint, which can mainly be ascribed to a more
uneven distribution among firm owners.
The fraction of capital employed in the intermediate goods industry increases by
roughly 3 p.p. Except for very small values of φ, the entrepreneurship rate of the
modified model is smaller than in the baseline economy (see the above mentioned
general equilibrium effects), but average firm sizes and profits are larger. The aver-
age firm size attains around 77% (vs. 67%) of its respective optimal value, and the
average excess demand for capital in the intermediate goods industry only amounts
to 40% (vs. 75%) of average business size.
Altogether, we observe that the economy, where the maximum loan also depends
on individual productivity, responds more sensitive to changes in φ, the marginal
gains of relaxing borrowing constraints being larger than in the baseline model.
Regarding mobility, we also find results qualitatively similar to the original
model. Mobility is decreasing if borrowing constraints are relaxed, and—except
for very small values of φ—the overall mobility between occupations is lower under
the modified borrowing constraint. Table 4 shows how the probabilities of switch-
ing between occupations with respect to productivity states and wealth quintiles are
affected, if credit availability also depends on individual productivity. The proba-
bility of switching occupations is higher for workers of the two lowest productivity
states (θw,1,θw,2) over the entire range of φ, which follows directly from (15), where
productivity unambiguously has a positive effect on the debt–to–equity ratio. Those
entrepreneurs, who are members of the third and fourth quintile are less likely to
switch, which reflects that ability compensates for lack of wealth.
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Table 5: Simulation results with iid shocks
Tightness of constraints
φ→ ∞ φ = 1.0 φ = 0
entrepreneurship rate (%) 0.245 0.244 0.240
∅ firm size total 0.376 0.355 0.327
∅ credit rationing total 0.000 0.045 0.129
∅ profits total 0.093 0.093 0.094
final Y 0.108 0.105 0.100
goods KF (%) 0.438 0.456 0.489
sector KF 0.072 0.073 0.075
LF 0.758 0.759 0.763
factor w 0.090 0.087 0.082
prices r 0.045 0.041 0.033
w/(r+δ) 0.849 0.861 0.887
factor labor 0.630 0.630 0.630
income capital 0.160 0.154 0.143
shares profits 0.210 0.216 0.227
∅ wealth total 0.164 0.159 0.154
workers 0.054 0.053 0.039
entrepreneurs 0.502 0.450 0.517
∅ income workers 0.096 0.093 0.086
entrepreneurs 0.146 0.143 0.142
risk premium 0.030 0.065 0.140
∅ consumption 0.098 0.095 0.091
welfare -10.420 -10.713 -11.336
wealth total 0.637 0.631 0.676
inequality workers 0.323 0.362 0.414
(Gini) entrepreneurs 0.379 0.311 0.246
mobility 0.025 0.014 0.004
4.3 The Model with IID Shocks
Although income and earnings persistence is the relevant environment from an em-
pirical point of view, we now confront the results from the baseline model with the
case of iid shocks. The major purpose of this exercise is to demonstrate how sensi-
tive the model responds to a change in serial correlation, especially, if it comes to
the implications for occupational choice and social mobility.
Table 5 shows the results from our numerical simulations, and Figure 7 compares
the baseline setting to the model with iid shocks. We observe that the qualitative re-
sults for aggregate output, wealth holdings, factor prices, consumption, and welfare
closely resemble the baseline model, although the effects differ in magnitude.
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Figure 7: Properties of the baseline model (dashed) for different levels of φ com-
pared with the model with iid shocks (solid)
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Table 6: Mobility and iid shocks: Individual probability of a switch in occupations
with respect to current productivity state and wealth quintile
Tightness of credit constraints Tightness of credit constraints
Productivity φ→ ∞ φ = 1.0 φ= 0 Quintile φ→ ∞ φ= 1.0 φ = 0
θw,1 0 0 0 1. 0 0 0
θw,2 0 0 0 2. 0.001 0 0
workers θw,3 0 0 0 3. 0.012 0.004 0
θw,4 0.125 0.067 0.019 4. 0.141 0.081 0.026
θw,5 0.489 0.288 0.111 5. 0 0 0
θe,1 0.205 0.144 0.057 1. 0 0 0
θe,2 0.181 0.124 0.047 2. 0 0 0
entre- θe,3 0.109 0.050 0.012 3. 0 0 0
preneurs θe,4 0 0 0 4. 0.554 0.314 0.104
θe,5 0 0 0 5. 0.0003 0 0
The overall output loss of the completely constrained economy vs. perfect capital
markets only amounts to 7.5%, compared to almost 25% in the baseline model. Only
5% (vs. 17%) of aggregate capital is relocated towards the final goods sector, and the
corresponding shift in the functional income distribution between profit and capital
income shares is rather small (1.7 vs. 4.6 p.p.). The same is true for consumption
(–10%) and wealth holdings (–6.2%), if constraints become more tight. Altogether,
we observe that the economy with iid shocks responds less sensitive to changes in
credit availability.
We find substantial differences between the two settings, if it comes to the inter-
mediate goods industry. The rate of entrepreneurship rises (vs. decline) if we relax
borrowing constraints in the model of serially uncorrelated shocks, and we observe
a strikingly different pattern of mobility; see Figure 7b and Table 6.
While the average firm size in the intermediate goods industry behaves similar to
the baseline model for a reduction in credit availability, the response of firm profits
is of opposite sign. The average firm size declines by 13% (vs. 68%) for φ→ 0, but
profits rise by 1.8% (vs. –15%). Although the change in the entrepreneurship rate
is rather small in scale, amounting only to 0.005 p.p., the effect from market exits is
large enough to increase average profits of those agents remaining in the industry.
Table 6 summarizes our results on between–group mobility in a stationary equi-
librium for the model with iid shocks. Irrespective of the degree of credit availability,
we find that switches between occupations can only be observed for the highly pro-
ductive workers (θw,4,θw,5), earning the highest wages, and the low–productivity en-
trepreneurs (θe,1−θe,3), earning the lowest profit incomes. Low and average produc-
tivity workers as well as the highly productive entrepreneurs never change their oc-
cupation. These results are in accordance with the economic intuition that earnings
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Figure 8: Wealth distribution in the baseline model for workers (solid) and entre-
preneurs (dashed) with φ→ ∞ and φ= 0
advantages translate into higher individual wealth, the latter being an important
determinant of entrepreneurship, especially in the presence of credit constraints.
However, overall mobility drops down sharply in the model with iid shocks com-
pared with the baseline model. Whereas in the first setting on average 15% of the
population changed their occupation in the stationary equilibrium, this figure goes
down to 0.4% – 2.4% over the entire range of φ.
If we look at the probability of a change in occupation for members of wealth
quintiles, we have to bear in mind that the wealth distribution of the economy with
uncorrelated shocks is almost completely segregated with respect to occupational
classes. Workers possess little wealth, and all rich households are entrepreneurs.
The nature of the underlying shocks is crucial for the between–group equilibrium
wealth distribution, which becomes obvious by comparing Figure 8 to Figure 2 of
the baseline model.
Referring to Table 6, we observe a zero probability for a change of occupation
for entrepreneurs of the lower three wealth quintiles as well for workers of the top-
most quintile because none of them is a member of the respective wealth group. For
workers, the probability of a status change is increasing in wealth and in credit avail-
ability. However, this altogether takes place at a very small scale, with only a 2.5%
chance for workers of the 4th quintile to become an entrepreneur in the next period
in the completely constrained economy and a 14% chance in the unconstrained one.
To understand mobility of entrepreneurs, we have to consider several factors.
The future occupation is determined (a) by the present level of wealth, (b) the
current draw of productivity governing present income, consumption and saving,
(c) the choice between two lotteries with unconditional probabilities governing fu-
ture income, consumption and saving, where the lottery over worker efficiencies is
less risky than the lottery over entrepreneurial productivities, and (d) the expected
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market equilibrium of the next period, determining factor prices and factor income
differentials.
Entrepreneurs of the 4th wealth quintile possess wealth amounts close to the
critical level which separates future entrepreneurs from future workers.11 If a mem-
ber of this wealth class receives a bad productivity shock today, his wealth might not
be large enough for self–employment to prove worthwhile, especially if becoming a
worker in the next period is the safer option and the expected income differential is
comparably small. Table 5 and Figure 7g show that the risk premium on entrepren-
eurial activity becomes very small if we relax borrowing constraints. This altogether
explains the comparably large probability for a market exit of entrepreneurs in the
4th wealth quintile. If hit by a bad productivity shock in the present, even some
business owners of the topmost wealth quintile switch occupations in the next pe-
riod. Generally, the probability of a change in occupation declines for an increase
in the tightness of financial constraints, which can be traced back to the substantial
increase in the risk premium on entrepreneurial activity and rising average profits.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we examined the effects of borrowing constraints and idiosyncratic
risks on macroeconomic performance, wealth inequality, and social mobility in a
two–sector heterogeneous agent dynamic general equilibrium model. Workers and
firm owners are subject to idiosyncratic (serially correlated) shocks. Entrepreneur-
ship in the intermediate (noncorporate) goods industry is the riskier occupation.
Our comparative static results cover the entire range of borrowing constraints, from
complete markets to a perfectly constrained economy.
The stationary wealth distribution generated in the model is consistent with
empirical findings. Entrepreneurial households own a substantial share of household
wealth and their share increases throughout the wealth distribution.
Independent of the persistence of the idiosyncratic shocks, we find that tight-
ening financial constraints is accompanied by substantial losses in aggregate out-
put, consumption, wealth holdings, and welfare, while wealth inequality increases.
The response of the macroeconomic variables to a change in credit availability is
monotonous and concave, indicating, that it is a worthwhile question to explore in
more detail the marginal gains from credit market improvement, which at this point
is left for future research. To the extent firms of the intermediate goods industry are
barred from participation in the credit market, more capital is employed in the final
(corporate) goods sector. The associated decline in the interest rate causes a shift in
the functional income distribution towards profit incomes.
11This, too, is endogenously determined in the occupational choice equilibrium.
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The general equilibrium context of our model, where optimal firm sizes and the
demand for credit are determined endogenously, gives rise to interesting implica-
tions regarding the change in the entrepreneurship rate and in social mobility as
we vary the degree of credit availability in the noncorporate sector. We find that
more individuals choose the entrepreneurial profession in the presence of credit
constraints compared to the unconstrained economy, and that mobility between oc-
cupations increases, too. Workers and entrepreneurs with high individual produc-
tivity tend to remain in their present occupation, whereas low productivity individ-
uals are more likely to switch between professions. Regarding exit and entry rates
into entrepreneurship, we find that higher persistence of shocks generally increases
between–group mobility.
These results reverse strikingly, if we assume iid shocks, thus indicating that the
nature of the underlying shocks plays an important role for the general equilibrium
effects. The comparative static results on the entrepreneurship rate and social mo-
bility respond sensitively to a change in income persistence.
There are many important issues this paper does not address. The model lacks a
fully micro.-founded formulation of credit constraints and a more detailed modeling
of financial intermediation. Also, testing the robustness of results with respect to
attitudes towards risk is left for future research. So far, we assume worker efficiency
and entrepreneurial ability to be uncorrelated, which can also be questioned, but it
is difficult to measure such correlation in the data (cf. Cagetti and De Nardi, 2006a).
Last, by simply stating the changes in the Gini coefficient, our results on inequality
are still highly aggregated and should, in a next step, be decomposed in order to find
out how good our calibration results on wealth concentration match distributional
data.
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A Computational Issues
The state space of wealth is approximated by a grid of N wealth levels an for n= 1, · · · ,N with
a1 = a and aN = k¯. The macroeconomic equilibrium is recursively computed. We start with a
initial guess on factor prices w˜, r˜, and the equilibrium level of employment in efficiency units
L˜. Let µ=
{
w˜, r˜, L˜
}
denote the vector of the initial guesses. We obtain factor proportions
in the final goods sector from this first solution trial. The underlying production technology
implies K˜F = L˜ w˜r˜+δ
γ
1−γ . Moreover, F(K˜F , L˜) equals L˜
(
w˜
r˜+δ
γ
1−γ
)γ
.
Let k(an,s( j)e) denote the firm size of an entrepreneur with productivity s( j)e and wealth
an is able to operate at for a given degree of borrowing constraints. His profit is given by
π [an, s( j)e|µ] = α (Bθ(i)e k(an,s( j)e))α L˜
(
w˜
r˜+ δ
γ
1− γ
)γ
− (r˜+ δ)k(an,s( j)e) .
Let aw(an, s( j)w |µ) and ξw(an, s( j)w |µ) as well as ae(an, s( j)e |µ) and ξe(an, s( j)e |µ) de-
note the policy functions associated with the optimization problems (11) and (12) for the
given initial guess on prices and employment. We characterize agents by their wealth hold-
ings an, their occupational status ζ, where ζ= 1 denotes a worker and ζ= 2 an entrepreneur,
and their current productivity state s( j)h, h= e,w.
Knowing the policy functions and transition matrices for the underlying productivity
shocks, we are able to compute the probability for an agent to have wealth an, occupational
status ζ and productivity state s( j). Let ψn,ζ,s(µ) denote the respective probability for n =
1, . . . ,N, ζ= 1,2 and s( j)h = θh, j, j = 1, . . . ,m, h= e,w.
The probabilities ψn,ζ,s(w˜, r˜, L˜) can be used to compute aggregate quantities. The aggre-
gate capital stock (i.e. mean wealth holdings) can be determined as:
K(µ) =
N
∑
n=1
2
∑
ζ=1
m
∑
j=1
ψn,ζ,s(µ)an
The entrepreneurship rate results as
λ(µ) =
N
∑
n=1
m
∑
j=1
ψn,2,s(µ)
while labor supply in efficiency units is given by
L(µ) =
N
∑
n=1
m
∑
j=1
ψn,1,s(µ)θw, j
Capital demand of the intermediate goods sector can be computed as:
KDI (µ) =
N
∑
n=1
m
∑
j=1
ψn,2,s(µ)k(an, s( j)e)
The supply of capital to the final goods sector is given by KSF(µ) =K(µ)−KDI (µ). Employment
L and capital input KF in the final goods sector generate an aggregate output of
Y (KF , L |µ) =
(
KγF ,L
1−γ)1−α N∑
n=1
m
∑
j=1
ψn,2,s(µ) (Bs( j)e)k(an, s( j)e))α
37
The initial solution guess only represents an equilibrium if the following conditions must
hold:
Labor supply in efficiency units must equal the initial guess L˜
L(µ) = L˜ (i)
Labor demand and capital demand in the final goods sector equal their respective supplies:
L(µ) = (1−α)(1− γ)Y (K
S
F(µ), L(µ) |µ)
w˜
(ii)
KSF(µ) = (1−α)γ
Y (KSF(µ), L(µ) |µ)
r˜+ δ (iii)
The algorithm for finding the equilibrium values consists of three nested loops over L˜, w˜ and
r˜. The first loop iteratively computes the value L˜ which meets condition (i) for given factor
prices w˜ and r˜. Then, factor prices w˜ and r˜ are adjusted according to the resulting excess
demands for labor and capital according to conditions (ii) and (iii). The whole procedure is
repeated until the equilibrium conditions (i) to (iii) are satisfied, except or a tolerably small
approximation error.
To implement the algorithm, we used the programming language C++. The underlying
source code and the data are available from the authors upon request.
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